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Abstract—EEG-based Brain-Computer-Interfaces are becoming available as consumer-grade devices, used in applications from
gaming to learning programs with neuro-feedback loops. While enabling attractive applications, their proliferation introduces novel
privacy concerns and security threats. One such example are attacks in which adversaries compromise EEG-based BCI devices, and
are able to analyze the users brain activity to infer private information about a user, such as their bank or area-of-living. However, a key
limitation of the above attacks is that they require user cooperation, and are thus easily detectable and rendered inefcient after
discovery.
In this paper, we propose and analyze a more serious threat - a subliminal attack in which, given that the visual probing lasts for less
than 13.3 milliseconds, the existence of any stimulus is below ones cognitive perception. We show that, even under such strong
limitations, the attackers can still analyze subliminal brain activity in response to the rapid visual stimuli and consequently infer private
information about the user.
By running a proof-of-concept study with 27 participants, we experimentally evaluate the feasibility of subliminal attacks using
EEG-based BCI devices. While not perfect, our results show that it is indeed feasible for attackers to subliminally learn probabilistic
information about their victims.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) devices are becoming increas-
ingly popular for use in applications such as entertainment, acces-
sibility, and cognitive enhancement [1], [2]. A popular technology
used in BCI for recording brain activity is Electroencephalography
(EEG), which uses external scalp electrodes to capture fluctuations
of the electrical potentials in the brain. The recorded EEG signal
is processed by the supporting software, which extracts salient
brainwave features, translates them into specific computer instruc-
tions, and feeds them back to the invoking application. The Emotiv
device [3] and the Neurosky device [4] are examples of low-
cost commodity BCIs, intended for home usage with applications
written by third-party developers and are available for download
from application markets (see, e.g., [5], [6]).
Privacy leaks via BCI. Martinovic et al. [7] recently emphasized
that BCI devices may make the raw EEG signal available to po-
tentially untrusted third-party applications. If such an application
is malicious, it can in turn abuse the BCI device to infer private
information about a victim, such as her/his preferred bank or area-
of-living. The general idea of this attack is similar to a polygraph,
where the interrogated person’s physiological reactions are used
to reason about his/her knowledge.
Limitations of supraliminal stimuli. However, a fundamental
limitation of the attacks proposed by Martinovic et al. is that they
rely on supraliminal (consciously perceived) stimuli and are thus
detectable. In the proposed attack, victims are repeatedly exposed
to specific visual stimuli that elicit distinctive and measurable
cognitive responses, resulting in leakage of private information,
such as user’s month of birth or chosen bank. Given the dura-
tion and repetitiveness of visual stimulation (sequence of images
shown over 90 seconds), users would easily become suspicious
and detect all but the most successfully integrated and innocuous
probes. Another issue preventing wide deployment of this attack
is that after a few users detect abnormal behavior of their newly
downloaded application, they would report it and flag it as not
functional or even malicious. It is a reasonable assumption that all
users of the application are connected via the application market,
which enables sharing such warnings or flags. This would prevent
the attacker from carrying out a large scale attack.
Can user privacy be compromised subliminally? Based on
these observations, we focus this work on researching if the
threat and potential reach of previously proposed attacks can be
significantly increased by preventing their conscious detection. As
a result, we propose a subliminal attack that infers private infor-
mation by probing the victim at a level below his/her cognitive
perception. Similar to subliminal advertising (see, e.g., [8]), our
key idea is to show the visual stimuli within the screen content
that the user expects to see, but for a duration that is too short for
conscious perception (several milliseconds), yet still sufficient to
result in detectable activation of certain parts of user’s brain. As an
example, for a video-based application, we propose to implement
small snippets of visual stimuli within a few frames of the video.
The attacker succeeds if he can infer private information about the
user without arousing the user’s suspicion.
This is a challenging task. If the stimuli are shown too promi-
nently, this increases the chance of the attack being detected. If, in
contrast, the attacker does too good a job of hiding the stimuli,
the user’s subliminal detection may not be sufficiently strong,
reducing the probability of inferring relevant private information.
Thus, the attacker must operate within this narrow regime of the
user’s input channel.
Results. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate for the
first time the feasibility of a subliminal attack via a proof-of-
concept study with 27 subjects. We conduct experiments on users
wearing EEG-based BCI devices. Our study implements an attack
scenario where a user watches a video and the attacker tries to
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2Fig. 1: The communication channels between the computer, the user, and the
BCI headset. The investigated side-channel attack is based on malware that
records data from the channel between the BCI headset and the computer
(dashed) and analyses it in order to uncover user’s private information. This
attack also contributes a signal to the visual channel (dotted), however this is
done in a way that prevents the user to consciously notice the modifications.
infer whether the user recognizes a particular person by hiding
pictures of this person in the video for a time duration shorter
than 13.3 milliseconds. To analyze users’ subliminal reactions to
the embedded visual stimuli, we use machine learning techniques
on the recorded EEG signal. For 18 out of the 27 subjects, our
classifier was able to guess the secret correctly, thus reducing the
attacker’s guessing entropy by 20.8%. This ratio even increases to
8 out of 9 in one variant of the attack, which reduces the attacker’s
entropy by as much as 48.8% when compared to random guessing.
The success chance did not vary significantly between subjects
who were able to detect that something was hidden in the video
and subjects who did not notice anything abnormal. While not
perfect, these experimental results show that the subliminal attack
is indeed feasible – attackers can make probabilistic inferences on
the users’ recognition of the person depicted in the visual stimuli
in a manner that is concealed from the user.
In conclusion, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a new attack against users wearing BCI de-
vices that is subliminal: it infers users’ private information
by exploiting brain activity in response to visual stimuli
that are not cognitively perceived by users. When carried
out carefully, such an attack can remain undetected.
• We experimentally demonstrate for the first time the feasi-
bility of subliminal attacks on EEG-based BCI devices via
a user study of 27 subjects. Our experimental results show
the feasibility of subliminally learning private information
about a user, such as whether the user recognizes the
person depicted in the visual stimuli.
• We discuss several potential countermeasures against the
presented attacks which subliminally probe for BCI users’
private information.
2 NEUROSCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
EEG-based BCI. Electroencephalography (EEG) monitors elec-
trical activity at the scalp that corresponds to changes in ion
concentrations of neurons in a functioning brain. A typical use of
EEG involves the attachment of one or several electrodes to coded
locations of the scalp and monitoring changes in potentials. The
signal of each pair of electrodes is amplified through a differential
amplifier, filtered, recorded at a high sample rate (typically in the
range of 128Hz-16kHz), and saved for later analysis.
EEG is widely used in a medical setting to monitor neurolog-
ical diseases. For instance, patients with epilepsy often undergo
EEG to observe and categorize seizures, which aids in the ap-
propriate choice of treatment. Other medical uses include diag-
nosing possible brain death of comatose patients, communication
with patients who suffer from locked-in syndrome, or control of
wheelchairs for handicapped [9].
In neuroscience research, EEG serves as a non-invasive, cost-
effective method of measuring brain activity. In comparison to
other methods, such as functional MRI, EEG is relatively low in
spatial resolution, but very high in temporal resolution, able to
precisely capture millisecond-scale changes in the activity of a
specific brain regions.
Depending on the needs of the users, EEG recording devices
vary in sampling frequency, number and location of electrodes,
and overall signal quality. Recently, affordable and portable EEG
devices have appeared on the market in the form of lightweight
consumer products for gaming and personal EEG monitoring.
Cognitive states picked up by such devices can be utilized by
games to allow users to control on-screen avatars, monitor and
train their own mental states, and improve gaming experience by
collecting information on reactions and emotions.
Event-Related Potentials (ERP). In many applications, EEG
signal is analyzed in conjunction with the presentation of visual
or auditory stimuli. The consequent EEG waveform caused by
the presentation of stimuli can be categorized into event-related
potentials (ERP), which are combinations of negative and positive
spikes occurring at different times after certain types of stimuli.
Those ERP-s that reliably occur after stimuli onset are usually
named by the polarity of the wave (N or P) and their delay in
milliseconds.
In our research, the most relevant example of an ERP is the
P300, a positive amplitude response whose amplitude peak occurs
approximately 300 milliseconds after stimuli onset. While both
its amplitude and latency can vary significantly (from as much to
250 ms to 500 ms), P300 was shown to be consistently elicited
when individuals decide between relevant and irrelevant stimuli,
including images or sounds considered novel or threatening [10],
[11]. The P300 has been successfully used in EEG devices to
enable users to spell letters using only EEG signals [12] and to
successfully perform guilty-knowledge tests, despite user’s active
efforts to conceal [13].
While in our attack we do focus on a single specific ERP,
given the relevance of P300 to the attacker’s goals of extracting
relevant information and previously achieved successes in its use
as a guilty-knowledge test, in our analysis we use it as a guidance
to choose a small subset of EEG channels used by the classifier.
Challenges of subliminal stimulation. While the majority of
sensory stimulation that we are exposed to in everyday lives is
sufficiently intensive to be consciously perceived (supraliminal),
in certain situations a stimulus can also be made subliminal if its
intensity is carefully controlled. For instance, if a visual stimuli
is shown sufficiently briefly, individuals might not be consciously
aware of it, but research has shown that such subliminal stimuli
does elicit responses as the brain processes it. Furthermore, it
was shown that subliminal stimuli even measurably impact one’s
behavior, for instance by influencing the choice of consumer
brands [14]. Given that an individual might not even be aware of
the influence that they are exposed to, the use of subliminal stimuli
in advertising purposes is strictly regulated in many countries.
Researchers agree on the existence of perceptual threshold,
an intensity that defines whether one will cognitively perceived a
3Fig. 2: An example of a video frame with the hidden subliminal stimulus in
the form of a face whose recognition the attacker wants to probe. Shown only
for the duration of a single frame, the stimulus is below cognitive perception
for most individuals.
stimulation or not, but determining specific values for any given
stimulus type is not straightforward. For instance, neuroscience
literature speaks of 10 ms to 55 ms as a suggested presentation
time range for a stimulus to be subliminal (a good overview
of designing experiments with subliminal stimuli can be found
in [15]), but it is also known that this duration not only varies
significantly among individuals, but also changes from day to day
for the same individual. As a result, most definitions of perceptual
threshold focus on levels of stimulation that result in stimulus
being undetected in a certain percentage of times it was presented
to a user.
In order to allow comparisons, we must necessarily use a sin-
gle stimulus duration for all participants. Considering the limita-
tions of the refresh frequencies of common off-the-shelf displays,
we chose to show each subliminal image for 13.3 milliseconds.
While this is on the shorter side of commonly used timings for
subliminal visual stimulation, we believe that it will enable us to
show the stimulus multiple times and still remain subliminal to
some users. On the other hand, shorter stimulus is likely to result
in weaker brain responses, which makes our task of extracting
private information additionally harder, and as such makes any
positive results significant.
Finally, we emphasize that an attacker could adapt the stimulus
duration to each specific victim and thus both achieve better hiding
of the stimuli, as well as stronger brain responses. We further
reflect on this in our results analysis in Section 7.
3 THREAT MODELS AND ATTACKS
In this section we introduce the system and adversary models
and describe the attack scenario for subliminal probing of private
information.
The system model consists of the user, the computer, and the
BCI-device. The user has bought a device and uses it at home with
various applications downloaded from the third-party developer
platform. The user trusts the computer and the BCI device. The
user actively supports setting up the device and calibrates it, if
necessary in order to ensure the minimal signal noise. We assume
that the user has an incentive to use the downloaded applications.
The attacker is an application developer. Through BCI-
device’s API, the application can access the raw EEG signal
recorded by the device. The attacker has modified a benign game
or video viewer by inserting his malicious code and has posted the
application on the platform with a slightly modified application
name. We assume that executing attacker’s application does not
result in the overall compromise of the system, i.e. attacker is not
able to break out of the BCI application’s sandbox.
Counting I Video I Counting II
2 min 15 min 2 min
S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S2 S1 S2…
Fig. 3: The experimental protocol is divided into 3 sub-experiments: Counting
I, Video I and Counting II. The embedded visual stimuli Sj are depicted above
the timeline.
The goal of the attacker is to obtain private user information.
This could be any of the scenarios proposed in [7] such as guessing
the banking provider, PINs, or month of birth. Generally, the target
can be any memory of the user that could be useful for an attacker.
For instance, the attacker can subliminally probe (until successful)
and blackmail users who seem to be familiar with the logos of
particular porn sites, or a repressive regime can try to identify
which users are familiar with some of the key persons of the
underground opposition.
Attack preparation. The attacker uses event-related potentials
(ERPs) to run the following strategy. The attacker designs a
number of visual stimuli that correspond to alternative answers
of the questions to which he wants to find an answer. For instance,
the attacker wants to verify if the user recognizes a particular
person, so he places this image and other visual stimuli, such as
images of other people, at random times and random positions of
the application and offers the application in the online application
store. In our setting, the application is a video viewer, and the
attacker includes images of people at random frames and at
random screen locations of the video. See, for instance, the video
frame depicted in Figure 2. In this paper, we assume that the
attacker wants to find out if the suspect recognizes a specific the
face.
Attack execution. After the user has downloaded and installed
the application and starts using it, the attacker collects the EEG
signal recorded while the user is exposed to the different images
displayed on the screen. Hoping that the person known to the user
triggers the strongest event-related potentials, the attacker analyzes
the EEG signal in a comparative way. This analysis works best if
the recorded data can be contrasted with prior recordings of the
victim, where it is known what the most relevant stimulus was.
An example of suitable prior observations for this purpose is EEG
data that has been generated while the user was calibrating the
BCI device. The usual calibration step consists of a sequence of
numbers that are being flashed randomly. The user must count
the occurrence of a particular number. Waiting for this number
to appear is a very good way to provoke P300 artifacts. This
calibration step of the device is often used by benign applications
that rely on ERPs, too. As a result, the attacker can incorporate his
attack in an application that requires this calibration step anyway.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we describe the setup of our proof-of-concept ex-
periment. Investigating whether the proposed subconscious side-
channel attack is feasible is a very challenging task due to many
factors that can affect the results. A negative outcome could
have many reasons. For instance, the equipment used could be
suboptimal, the video used to hide the attack could have many
4still images where it is hard to hide a stimulus, the secret that is
being attacked could be too complex, and so on. Therefore, our
experiment is designed to investigate whether the attack is feasible
instead of starting off with sophisticated variants. In particular, we
make design decisions that minimize the chance that the attack
fails due to factors that we can control. For instance, we use a good
EEG device and a video with flickering artifacts that helps hide
the attack. The following sections detail other design decisions.
4.1 Test Population and Setup
After obtaining approval from the Institutional Review Board, 29
undergraduate and graduate students (21 males and 8 females) in
the Computer Science department were recruited to participate in
our experiment, 2 of which had unusable data due to recording
problems. All subjects were self-screened for neurological dis-
orders and metal implants which could potentially interfere with
recording. Prior to the experiment, subjects were informed of the
basic EEG procedures, but not yet informed of the subliminal
nature of the stimuli. The participants signed informed consent
and received compensation in the form of a $40 gift card. The
experiment took 90 minutes total for each user, including setup
time. This was the main limiting factor for population size.
ActiveTwo BioSemi equipment [16] was used for the collection
of EEG data. Participants were measured and fitted with a tight
cap, and 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes were attached to the cap with
conducting gel. All electrodes were then attached to a low-noise
DC coupled post-amplifier, with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. All
stimuli were presented in a dim room on a CRT monitor (75Hz
refresh rate) using presentation software [17].
4.2 Experimental Protocol
After the setup described above, the participants were asked to
try to remain relaxed for the entire duration of the experiments.
The interaction with the participants was kept as short and concise
as possible. There were four parts to the complete experiment,
two parts pertained to a counting task discussed below, and the
other task involved observing videos. Figure 3 semantically shows
the parts on a timeline for better understanding. The following
sections give details of each part of the experiment.
Counting I and II. In these parts of the experiment, the participant
was presented with a randomly permuted sequence of numbers
from 0 to 10. Each number except 1 appeared exactly 16 times.
The digit 1 could appear anywhere between 14-18 times, chosen
uniformly at random. The participant was asked to count the
number of occurrences of the number 1. Each stimulus lasted
for 250 ms, and pauses between stimuli were randomly chosen
to be between 250 ms and 375 ms long. At the end of this step
of the experiment, the participants were asked for their count to
check for correctness. This part of the experiment lasted for about
2 minutes. It was carried out in the beginning of the experiment
(counting I) and at the end (counting II). These counting tasks
are standard tasks used to calibrate BCI devices to users to ensure
correct functionality of BCI applications.
Video I. In this phase, the participant was instructed to watch
a 15 minute long black and white video extracted from Charlie
Chaplin’s ”The Gold Rush” (1925). They were asked to pay
attention to the plot of the video to make sure they concentrated
on watching the video through its entire duration. Two kinds of
stimuli (S1 and S2) were used, one with a black and white portrait
of Barack Obama (Figure 3) (S1) and the other being a blurred
image of a human face (S2). We choose these stimuli in order to
make sure that every subject was familiar with S1 and would not
recognize S2. Given that the our experiments were conducted at
a US university at the time when Barack Obama was the acting
president, we can safely assume that we know the correct answer
for all participants. In a real-world scenario, the adversary might
similarly prove victim’s recognition of a known face in order to
validate a particular configuration of the attack.
A stimulus was shown every 5 seconds, making a total of
180 stimuli over 15 minutes. Every 4th stimulus was S1 and was
displayed at the top right corner of the image frame. The position
of S2 rotated along the remaining three corners. Each stimulus
was shown for 13.3 ms. The limiting factor of this time was the
screen refresh rate (75Hz). Once the video ended, the participant
moved on to the next part of the experiment.
Recognition survey. As we are ultimately interested in under-
standing the feasibility of carrying out the attack subconsciously,
the participants were asked at the end of the experiment if they
noticed anything odd in the video. If they negated, no further
questions were asked. However, in the case of a positive answer,
they were asked for details of what they saw. We categorize their
answers as follows: participant recognized nothing, participant
saw something, participant saw a face, participant saw “Barack
Obama”.
User study limitations. Considering that we designed the user
study to mimic a potential real-world attack, while at the same
time minimizing the likelihood of a negative result due to con-
trollable factors, it does have a few limitations that we discuss
upfront.
Firstly, the study focuses on probing a single type of private
information: whether the user recognizes a given face or not.
While this does not allow us to reason about the ability to extract
arbitrary information, it does indicate that similar subliminal
attacks might be possible. Secondly, the subliminal nature of our
study does not allow us to fully disclose its details to participants
until its very end. As a result, our only measure of the extent to
which a particular user detected any probing is the recognition
survey. While we made several steps to reduce the experimenter
bias and pose the question of ”noticing anything odd” neutrally, it
is possible that the responses of some participants were influenced
by the mere fact that they were being asked such a question,
or by wanting to please the experimenters by giving a positive
answer. However, we believe that participants are less likely to
mis-report not seeing anything than to conform to potentially
detected demand characteristics [18]. Additionally, the survey
answer was not properly noted for four participants; those were
indicated as N/A in our results. Lastly, even though we screen for
neurological disorders, some conditions, such as Developmental
Prosopagnosia [19], inhibit face recognition, but often remain
undetected. Despite the study being carried out at a US university
during Barack Obama’s presidency, it is possible that some users
were unable to recognize his face and thus impact the final results.
Despite these limitations, the results of our user study provide
a clear confirmation that subliminal probing for private informa-
tion is indeed possible, and could present a significant threat to
user privacy in the future.
55 DATA ANALYSIS
The methods described in this section serve to investigate the level
to which different subliminal side-channel attacks with BCIs are
feasible if the attacker controls screen content and has access to
raw EEG data. We are carrying out a proof-of-concept by running
an attack under controlled conditions.
As described above, the user has calibrated the BCI by actively
participating in a counting experiment. Then, at a later point in
time, the user watches a video while still wearing the device. The
attacker manipulates the video and insert oval images of two kinds
at random screen locations and at random times. His goal is to
identify which person does the user recognize by analyzing the
EEG data that is collected while the user watches the video. From
a technical perspective, we want to evaluate whether the classifier
can extract sufficient information from the recorded EEG signal in
order to determine one of the three different types of brain activity:
1) unknown face, 2) a face that the user subliminally recognizes,
or 3) a plain video sequence without any subliminal stimulation.
Given a classifier that consistently discriminates between these
three types of brain activity, the attacker can use it to learn new
private information about a chosen victim.
5.1 Data Acquisition and Preprocessing
The raw data consists of wave signals from a number of different
electrodes, called channels, whose positions are shown in Figure 4.
The subset of channels used by the classifier is marked with
red rectangles, and each channel is sampled at 1024Hz. We
correlate the EEG signals with exact positions of stimuli using
the timestamps obtained from the software. For preprocessing,
we first divide the signal into epochs, each epoch ranging from
200 ms prior to 1000 ms after every stimulus onset. Each such
epoch is associated with the respective stimulus that triggers it.
For each epoch, we then calculate the mean of the first 200 ms to
get a baseline and subtract this baseline from the entire epoch. We
reduce the high frequency noise by passing the signals through
a low pass filter with a pass band of [0.35, 0.4] in normalized
frequency units. Finally, we apply a median filter that extracts the
median from each four consecutive measurements.
5.2 Classification
The goal of the attacker is to train a classifier which identifies if the
stimulus is relevant for the user. Classification requires a training
set of data containing observations whose class membership is
already known and a test set to evaluate its performance. We now
describe the classifier framework that we use to predict stimulus
relevance from EEG signals.
Classification Setting. In our setting, each epoch is one observa-
tion. Each epoch corresponds to a single stimulus and contains
the signals from all the EEG channels for a time period of
[signal - 200ms, signal + 1000 ms]. If C denotes the number
of channels being used and f denotes the sampling frequency, we
have (1000 + 200)f = S measurements per channel per epoch.
We group the signals from all the channels for each epoch into a
feature vector of dimensionality K = C × S. The classification
algorithm consists of two phases, training and testing. In the
training phase, the input samples provided to the classifier are
of the form: {xi ∈ X, yi} where X = {xi ∈ RK , i =
1, ...N}, N denotes the total number of input epochs. The set
Y = {yi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, ...N} denotes the class labels, i.e.
Fig. 4: Positions of the channels used by the classifier. The classifier uses
primarily data from parietal and occipital lobes.
whether epoch xi corresponds to the target stimulus relevant to
the subject (yi = 1) or not (yi = 0). Since the system used to
display the stimuli captured the indicator of each stimuli and the
corresponding timestamp, for each epoch, the value of yi could be
obtained. Given this set of inputs for training, the classifier learns
the function that maps the feature vector (epochs) to the stimulus
indicator:
f(xi) : xi ∈ RK → y ∈ {0, 1}
In the testing phase, the classifier is provided with a set of
fresh observations xi for which it must output label predictions
yi. In other words, the classifier must predict for each epoch, if
the corresponding stimulus shown to the participant is relevant or
not.
Boosted Logistic Regression (BLR). We use a logistic regression
method to make predictions on the stimulus relevance given the
EEG signal. We train this classifier by minimizing the negative
Bernoulli log-likelihood of the corresponding model in an iterative
fashion as proposed in [20], [21]. A variant of this technique
was used for P300 spelling in [12] with MATLAB code being
available online. Also, Martinovic et al. used it for their attack [7]
and it showed good performance for guessing user secrets from
event-related potentials. For these reasons, we also chose this
classifier for our experiment. As follows, we briefly describe how
the classifier works. We will use the same notation as in the
original paper [12] to simplify following up on details.
The boosted logistic regression classifier (BLR) variant that we
employ is an ensemble method. This means it consists out of a set
ofM ∈ N individual classifiers fm withm ∈ {1, . . . ,M} that all
output individual classifier scores. Each classifier has a linear form
fm(xi;wm) = w
T
mxi with coefficients w that differently weight
the recorded channels at different points of time. These individual
classifiers are incrementally blended into a single classifier Fm.
At step m, the probabilistic model underlying classifier Fm is
pm(yi=1|xi) = exp(Fm(xi))
exp(Fm(xi)) + exp(−Fm(xi)) (1)
and represents the probability that the stimulus of the current
epoch i is a target stimulus given the concatenated EEG signal
6xi. The likelihood of this model for all epochs of the training data
(i.e. the data where labels Yi are given) is
L(Fm;X,Y)=
N∏
i=1
pm(yi=1|xi)yi · [1−pm(yi=1|xi)]1−yi
(2)
In the training phase, we iteratively optimize this function. At
every optimization step m, the classifier of the last step is updated
by adding a new weak classifier: Fm = Fm−1+fm. The weights
of this additional classifier are computed by minimizing the least-
squares distance of the gradient of the log-likelihood:
fm=argmin
f
N∑
i=1
([
∂L(F (xi))
∂F (xi)
]
F=Fm−1
−fm(xi;wm)
)2
(3)
At each update step, the new weak classifier fm is added with
a weight γm such that, finally, the ensemble classifier is FM =∑M
m=1 γmfm. These weights are computed after the optimization
step of the respective fm with Eq. 3. It is selected such that Eq. (2)
becomes maximal. Please see the full details of this algorithm and
an experimental evaluation in [12].
Data Dimensionality & Features. In the described training phase,
we provide all EEG data of the counting experiment together with
the class labels to Eq. (2). For instance, if the classifier is trained
to detect recognition of number 1, then epochs triggered by the
number 1 are accounted to class yi = 1 and epochs with other
numbers get the class label yi = 0. For each weak classifier C ·
S, we must learn the coefficients w ∈ RK . If we record many
channels at a high frame rate, then the optimization in Eq. (3)
can become under-determined if too few epochs are available for
training. We approached this problem of a low observation-to-
dimension ratio by taking only those channels into account that
are located along the z-axis, parietal, and occipital areas of the
scalp where P300 ERPs are usually the strongest. In particular
we use only channels ‘Fz’, ‘Cz’, ‘Pz’, ‘P3’, ‘P4’, ‘PO7’, ‘PO8’,
‘Oz’. In order to further reduce the dimensionality of the data,
for each channel we compute the median of every 4 consecutive
measurements to reduce the dimensionality by a factor of 4. This
adds the side effect of denoising the signal by a median filter.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of subliminally probing
for private user information by running several experiments, each
representing a different scenario that an attacker might attempt.
We first confirm that the described classifier indeed achieves
results that are comparable to previous work on EEG-based attacks
when trained and tested on supraliminal data. We then show
that our subliminal stimuli has indeed remained hidden for a
subset of users. As a result, subliminal probing of some users is
possible if their brain responses are sufficiently strong. This threat
is confirmed by showing in Section 6.3 that a classifier trained
on subliminal data can achieve strong classification results when
evaluated on the same type of data.
Most importantly, Section 6.4 shows that an attacker can train
the classifier on data recorded during supraliminal stimulation,
such as the one used during the calibration of the BCI device,
and then use it to probabilistically learn private information about
the victim who is subliminally probed. Finally, we describe and
show how can an attacker additionally improve the classification
performance, given that he has an estimate of the classifier’s
confidence.
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Fig. 5: Aggregated output of a classifier trained on supraliminal data from the
second counting experiment, conducted 20 minutes later. The classifier must
extract the private information: which number between 0 and 10 was the user
counting. While the achieved performance is not perfect, the classifier shows
persistency over time, especially considering that part of classification errors
are likely due to (measured) difference in participants’ focus.
6.1 Classifier Validation on Supraliminal Stimuli
The success of the attack presented in Section 3 depends fun-
damentally on the strength of the BLR classifier described in
Section 5.2. Before evaluating it on more difficult subliminal
attacks, we begin by affirming its reliability using a sanity check
by both training and testing on supraliminal data.
Setup. In this experiment, we train BLR with data collected from
the first counting phase of the experiment. This is the phase
where the user calibrates the device by counting the occurrences
of number 1, while a sequence of random numbers between
0 and 10 is repeatedly flashed on the screen. We extract the
corresponding epochs from the EEG recordings and label all
epochs that correspond to number 1 as the positive class, while
all other epochs are labeled as the negative class. We expect the
classifier to learn to discriminate between EEG epochs recorded
while an irrelevant number is shown on the screen (negative class),
and epochs recorded while the target number that is shown.
When testing its performance, our goal is to verify if the
classifier correctly determines user’s private information, namely
the number that they were counting. While all users in our
experiment were instructed to count the occurrences of number
1, this information is not explicitly available to classifiers that are
trained for each user. We test the performance of the classifier by
feeding it with epochs of EEG data recorded while one of stimuli
(numbers) were shown on the screen. For each input epoch, the
classifier outputs a score that represents the likelihood of the epoch
having been recorded while the number shown on the screen was
indeed the one that user counted (positive class). In order to make
a final decision on the private counted number, we average the
output scores across each of the 11 different stimuli (0-10), and
pick the number with highest average score as the final output.
The classifier is successful if it indeed generalizes on the
epochs of the second counting sequence, in which the user re-
peated the counting task. The only major difference in the second
counting sequence is that the users are slightly less focused after
having conducted the calibration phase and after having watched
the video. This is supported by the average counting error of the
users, which are larger in the second counting phase (0.72) than in
the first phase (0.38).
Results. As a sanity check, we test the classifier both on data
from the first counting phase, used for training, and the test data
from the second counting phase. As expected, the outputs on
the training data are accurate: the classifier correctly guesses the
private information (number 1) for all users. Figure 5 shows the
results of testing the classifier on the second counting sequence,
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Fig. 6: Outputs of the classifier trained on the first half of subliminal stimuli in the form of faces hidden in the video, and tested on the other half. After training
on subliminal data, the classifier outputs the correct result for the large majority of users, irrespective of the level of their stimulus detection. This shows that
subliminal stimulation does indeed impact the recorded EEG data.
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Fig. 7: Aggregated levels of participants’ detection of the visual stimuli hidden
in the video. While the stimulus did not remain hidden from all participants, the
stimulation was indeed subliminal, with only 7 participants able to correctly
detect the stimuli that was repeatedly shown throughout the duration of the 20
minute long video.
recorded 20 minutes later. Even though the accuracy of classi-
fication does decrease, the extracted private information is still
correct for the majority of users. We conclude that the classifier
indeed probabilistically extracts private information, but observe
that detecting the relevant stimulus for a user in such counting
experiment is not straightforward, even when the classifier is both
trained and tested on supraliminal data.
In order to allow comparisons with related work on the topic
of EEG-based privacy attacks [7], we quantify the attacker’s
information gain in each experiment as the relative reduction in
Shannon entropy that the classifier output provides in comparison
to the entropy of a random guessing attack. The results show
that, in comparison to randomly guessing the relevant stimuli,
the attacker who relies on such classifier is able to reduce his
guessing entropy by about 38.8%. This is very much in line with
previously reported EEG-based attacks on privacy [7] that relied
on supraliminal stimuli and allowed the attacker to achieve a
10-40% decrease in guessing entropy. Furthermore, these results
suggest that, on a technical level, predicting relevant stimuli is a
difficult learning task, such that any success that we achieve in our
proof-of concept subliminal attack is significant.
6.2 Stimulus Subliminality
We begin exploring subliminal stimulation by first analyzing the
level to which the stimulus remained hidden from participants in
the experiment. As described in Section 2, the level of cognitive
perception of a visual stimulus depends on a number of factors
which vary significantly between scenarios, environments, and
individuals. As a result, there usually do not exist established
duration thresholds that result in subliminal responses. Instead,
subliminal stimuli are defined as those that remain undetected
in a certain percentage of the times that they are shown to an
individual. Given the fact that the same stimulus is repeatedly
shown to participants in our experiment, we expect some of them
to be able to detect it, even if we shorten the stimulus duration in
comparison to what is often reported in relevant literature (10 ms
to 55 ms).
The results of asking participants if anything seemed “strange”
while watching the video are given in Figure 7. The subjects
are divided into five different groups, representing the different
recognition levels of the users. As expected, the subliminality
of the stimulus varied for different users. While a total of 7
participants were indeed able to recognize an image of Barack
Obama, 5 users did not notice anything unusual, while further 3 of
them only “saw something”. Despite being detected by a subset of
users, our stimuli remained completely hidden from some users.
This supports the hypothesis that private information could be
subliminally probed using EEG based BCI devices, especially if
the attacker can adapt to a specific victim by gradually increasing
the stimulus duration in order to ensure that it remains undetected.
We further discuss possible ways to hide the stimuli in Section 7.
6.3 Probing for Subliminal Information
Ultimately, the attacker’s goal is to be able to train the classifier
on EEG data that was recorded while the user was calibrating the
device, for instance, by counting occurrence of a specific number
(supraliminal stimuli). Such classifier could then ideally be used
on subliminal data to probe for relevancy of particular stimuli
that are shown beyond victim’s cognitive perception (e.g. to detect
recognition of a face or detect which face is most relevant to
the victim). Before evaluating the classifier in this scenario, we
first evaluate a variant of attack in which the adversary trains the
classifier on known subliminal stimuli, and then probes the user
using the same type of subliminal stimulus. While training on
supraliminal data is more likely to generalize well and be available
since it is can be performed during standard calibration processes,
training and both testing on the same domain and using subliminal
data is useful to an attacker since it can offer a good proxy measure
of confidence in classifier output.
Setup. We carry out an experiment in which we train the classifier
on the first half of the epochs that have been recorded while the
user watches the modified video. This time, we label all epochs
during which an Obama image was shown as the positive class,
and epochs that correspond to blank video or unknown face as the
negative class. We call this modified classifier BLRF to account
for the fact that it was trained on faces instead of numbers. Hence,
the classifier is directly trained for a specific type of stimuli
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Fig. 8: Aggregated outputs of the classifier trained on subliminal faces stimuli,
and tested on the counting sequence, while users counted occurrences of
number 1. The classifier trained on subliminal data does not generalize on
the supraliminal counting sequence, suggesting overlearning.
and is, as such, expected to generalize to novel situations less
successfully.
We test the classifier on the second half of the epochs collected
from the modified video, using the same procedure as described
in Section 6.1, where outputs for each of three stimuli classes are
averaged for each user, and the maximum is taken as the final
verdict.
Results. Figure 6a shows the results of training on subliminally
shown stimulus, and testing on subsequent epochs recorded while
the same type of stimulus is presented. The attack was successful
for almost all users, failing only for one user who recognized a face
in the video. The statistics of the aggregated users across different
levels of consciousness are shown in Figure 6b, where it is visible
that achieved results do not vary significantly depending on the
level of observation reported by users. This on-the-fly calibration
of the attack leads to very accurate results and has the advantage
that the user is not required to perform a calibration phase.
The shown results allow us to conclude that subliminal stimuli
do indeed trigger responses that are consistently detectable using
EEG-based BCI devices. Consequently, if the adversary is able to
train a classifier while the user is exposed to similar stimuli for
which private information is known, subliminal stimuli can pose a
privacy threat to users.
Generalization Performance. We now evaluate how well does
training on specific stimuli for subliminal face recognition gen-
eralize to other tasks, expecting generalization to suffer due to
overlearning. We investigate this hypothesis by testing the face-
trained classifier BLRF on the epochs of the counting sequence
and report the results in Figure 8. Even though the BLRF classifier
has the biggest chance to output the correct answer (number 1), it
also predicts other numbers with similar probability. It is visible
that BLRF does not generalize well from subliminal training to
testing on epochs recorded in counting experiments.
This means that the face-trained classifier BLRF might be
less applicable than the classifier based classifier BLR. A face in
the visual field triggers many face-detection and face-recognition
processes [22] and, as a consequence, leads to strong event-related
potentials that might be detected by the BCI. The weak generaliza-
tion from face-based subliminal training to counting data is likely
a result of BLRF classifier predominately using signals related to
processing images of faces, which do not generalize well to other
tasks.
6.4 Transfer Learning: Subliminal Probing Using
Supraliminal Training
After confirming that the subliminal responses can indeed be
reliably detected using our EEG setup, we now evaluate the
attack that subliminally probes for user’s private information. The
adversary trains the classifier on supraliminal data acquired during
user’s calibration, and then uses the classifier on the subliminal
data acquired while the user is performing a different task. From
a machine learning perspective, this is a challenging task, as the
classifier needs to generalize from one domain to another.
Setup. During training, the BLR classifier was provided with data
from Counting I, as was described in Section 6.1. For testing,
we extract all epochs triggered by hidden images of Barack
Obama, all epochs triggered by the unknown face, and equally
many epochs taken from random frames where the video was
not manipulated. Again, we let the classifier output a score for
each epoch of this dataset. Recall that, based on the training data
used, this score outputs the classifier’s belief that the user has
‘counted’ the respective stimulus. Even though the user did not
actively count the target stimulus (she should not even realize that
it is on the screen), the classifier is searching for the same artifacts
in the EEG signal.
As in the counting experiment, the final output of the classifier
is the candidate stimulus that gets the highest average classifier
score. This time, there are three possible outcomes. Since we
assume that all participants recognize an image of Barack Obama,
we can compare the classifier output against this ground truth.
Results. We show the output statistics in Figure 9a. For 18
users the classifier outputs the correct answer. For 5 users, BLR
predicted ‘Unknown face’ and for 4 users BLR predicted ‘Blank’.
From a machine learning perspective, it appears that the attack
works, as the classifier is able to distinguish a relevant stimulus
from irrelevant stimuli. The reduction in guessing entropy is ex-
pectedly smaller than in previously reported supraliminal attacks
(and our baseline); however, it still equals a high 20.84%. This is
an important result, which shows that attackers could indeed care-
fully design their visual stimuli such that they remain subliminal,
and still probabilistically reduce the entropy of guessing relevant
private information using EEG-based BCI devices.
We show the classifier output split by different levels of user
awareness in Figure 9b. The attack works almost independently
of the extent to which the victims realize that the video has been
manipulated and in each recognition group, the classifier found
the correct answer for the majority of users. In this light, it is
interesting to compare the results of BLR with the results of
BRLF , trained on face data and tested on counting data.
Comparison of BLR and BLRF . The fact that the predictive
power of the classifier translates from the counting scenario to the
attack scenario, but not vice versa, suggests that the two classifier
variants are trained to detect different neuro-physiological pro-
cesses. On the one hand, considering that BLRF classifier does
not generalize well on the counting task, it is possible that the ma-
jority of its classification success stems from using face detection
features, rather than detecting the stimulus that is most relevant to
the user. On the other hand, even though the BLR classifier is never
trained on subliminal stimuli of recognizing faces (and hasn’t been
exposed to face recognition during training), it still achieves strong
generalization performance. This further gives confidence that the
standard calibration task in which users are required to count one
number suits as a strong basis for training classifiers that extract
subliminal private information based on its relevancy to the victim.
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Fig. 9: Detecting subliminal responses based on supraliminal training (Numbers on Faces). For each user, the classifier outputs which type of stimulus results
in recognition, the three possible candidates being: Obama, Unknown face, and random periods with no subliminal stimuli (Blank). Outputs are correct for the
majority (18 out of 27) of participants (Figure a), irrespective of their level of stimuli detection (Figure b), showing that such an attack is indeed feasible.
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Fig. 10: Using confidence thresholds, the attacker is able to increase clas-
sification performance by not making some decisions. Green and red lines
depict correct and incorrect classifications depending on different thresholds.
Black line shows the number of positively confirmed hypothesis that the
most prominent stimulus is the one for known face. The vertical dashed line
represents the threshold used in further analysis.
6.5 Utilizing Classification Confidence
We now propose a method to make the results of the attack more
reliable, given the assumption that the attacker has an estimate of
confidence in classifier outputs acquired by validation. We begin
by distinguishing two slightly different attack scenarios and then
introduce a way to compute confidence scores for each of them.
Targeted probing versus agnostic probing. The experiments
with the modified video are targeted towards a specific person
that the attacker suspects the user might recognize and probes to
validate this hypothesis. He contrasts EEG data showing images
of this person against images that are most likely irrelevant for
the user. If the classifier ranks the epochs highest that correspond
to the person of interest, then the attacker concludes that the user
knows this person. In an alternative attack scenario, the attacker
does not know for which alternative to test for. In this agnostic
attack, the attacker confronts the user with k stimuli that could
potentially be relevant to the user. Then the attacker must make a
one-out-of-k decision based on the recorded EEG data. This task
is more difficult than the targeted attack. In the targeted attack the
attacker can simply discard the hypothesis if the target stimulus
did not achieve the highest score. In agnostic probing, there will
always be a stimulus that achieves the highest score. The attacker
must decide if he trusts this outcome. In the next paragraph we
propose a method to decide with confidence, and report on the
results of an attack where we simulate that the attacker does not
know in advance that he is probing for Obama.
Improving attacks using confidence measures. In both the
targeted attack and the agnostic attack, the attacker must decide
whether to trust the classifier outcome and accept the hypothesis
or to reject it. A technical way to base this decision is to compute
a measure of confidence for a given classifier outcome and request
a minimal confidence score for accepting the hypothesis.
For targeted attacks, we propose to compute the difference
between the average classifier scores of the epochs that show
the target class and the average score of the closest non-target
class. For instance, if we probe for Obama’s image and this class
achieves the highest score, while the unknown face achieves the
second best score, then the measure of confidence is the difference
between these two scores. Only if this difference exceeds a
predefined threshold does the attacker accept it. In all results
that we have reported so far, we used a threshold of 0, i.e. the
Obama hypothesis is accepted if only the corresponding epochs
score the highest. In a scenario where the attacker wants to avoid
false positives, he can implement a higher threshold to get more
prudent estimates. In the opposite situation, if the attacker is less
risk-averse, he can use a negative confidence threshold to accept
the hypothesis even if the target class is not ranked first by the
classifier.
For agnostic attacks, the confidence score can be applied
similarly. If the class that ranks highest has a classifier score that
exceeds the second best class by a predefined confidence score,
then the attacker accepts the hypothesis. If not, the outcome means
that none of the presented stimuli is relevant for the victim.
Results. In Figure 10, we report the results of these modified
attacks. The x-axis depicts the applied threshold of the confidence
score. The y-axis depicts the number of users for which the
attack hypothesis was accepted by the attacker, given the current
threshold. With agnostic probing, incorrect hypotheses can also
be accepted (we aggregate all incorrect outcomes, namely the
unknown face and frames with no stimuli, under a single error
rate). If the confidence threshold is negative, the attacker accepts
the Obama hypothesis even if its epochs do not achieve the highest
average classifier score.
As can be seen, the number of subjects where the attacker
accepts the correct hypothesis declines for all attacks as the
threshold of the confidence score increases. Luckily (for the at-
tacker), the empirical chance of accepting a wrong answer declines
considerably faster than the one of accepting correct answers. As
a result, there are configurations in which users can be attacked
with better accuracy. When an attacker deploys the attack, he must
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Fig. 11: Using stricter confidence thresholds, the attacker can trade making less decisions for increasing overall classification performance. For example, using a
confidence threshold defined in Figure 10 results in making correct classification decisions for 8 out of a total of 9 participants.
reason about risks and costs of false negatives and false positives
and select an appropriate threshold. For instance, in Figure 10,
we highlight a threshold that would be a prudent choice for an
agnostic attack where false positives are costly for the attacker.
The summary statistics of the outcome of such attacks with
a prudent confidence threshold are given in Figure 11a, while
the detailed outcomes are depicted in Figure 11b. As can be
seen, the confidence criterion affects decisions at all levels of user
awareness. If the attacker is willing afford to not make a decision
for all victims, he can in turn get more reliable results by apply
the confidence criterion. For instance, for a threshold of about
0.015, the attacker’s probability of successful guessing increases
to 8 out of 9 attempts, which is a decrease in entropy of 49.8% in
comparison to random guessing.
6.6 Summary of Experimental Results
The main experimental results presented in this paper are three-
fold.
Firstly, in Section 6.2, we show that a carefully designed
visual stimulus can remain subliminal for a subset of users, while
still eliciting detectable and consistent responses (Section 6.3).
Our main result is presented in Section 6.4. Experiments
show that a classifier that is trained on supraliminal data (recorded
during user calibration) can indeed be useful to detect user’s
responses to subliminal stimulation. This is an important result,
since it shows that the attacker can reduce his guessing entropy on
the task in our experiments by as much as 20%.
Finally, our experiments use a conservative setup, in which
both the classification threshold and the stimulus duration are
identical for all users. As results in Section 6.5 show and we
further discuss in Section 7, the attacker can additionally increase
his attack success by relying on measurements of classifier con-
fidence and adapting stimulus duration to each victim. For one
such threshold, the classifier in our experiments makes the correct
decision for 8 our 9 users, which effectively reduces attacker’s
guessing entropy by almost 49%.
7 DISCUSSION
We now critically discuss our attack and its possible extensions,
and suggest several potential ways to defend against subliminal
probing for private information.
7.1 Extensions & Limitations
Long-term attacks. Although our experiment has shown that it is
feasible within one EEG recording session to acquire information
about the subject, the ideal setup in a real-world situation would
be to collect EEG data over long periods of time.
The subliminal nature of the stimuli presents a large advantage
over the method presented in Martinovic et al. in that the user may
never realize anything strange is going on, and proceed to use the
application and expose sensitive EEG data for large periods of
time [7]. A larger body of data could be more useful in training the
classifier and gaining more information about the user by making
it possible to present a larger amount of subliminal stimuli. It
would therefore be easier to slowly build a profile of various facts
about the user which could be used against them.
However, other EEG security work on using EEG as a form
of authentication shows that EEG over multiple sessions may
decrease in accuracy, as electrode placement and small aspects
of the device setup can change from session to session [23]. To
address this problem, our method of subliminal validation with
stimuli that the user certainly knows can be used to estimate the
degradation of the classifier performance and trigger its re-training
if needed.
Dry EEG. Our current experiment uses research-grade EEG
recording equipment, which is relatively expensive and has a
long setup process involving the injection of gel into the EEG
cap. Additional experiments need to be done in order to conclude
that similar effects can be captured with current consumer-grade
EEG devices, but given the fact that we use only a small subset
of channels that are found on consumer-grade devices as well,
it is reasonable to assume that such attacks could be replicated.
Companies are looking to create EEG devices with dry electrodes
that have the same resolution as ones that require gel [24], since
this reduces the setup time and allows performing more extensive
experiments. As such devices are made affordable to the public,
it becomes more likely that subliminal attacks similar to ones
presented in this paper are deployed.
Improved strategies to hide stimuli. One direction in which our
proof-of-concept could be improved is to better hide the stimuli
in the video that is being shown. With respect to subliminal
stimulation, we are constrained by the need to choose the same
duration for each individual, as well as the limits of the hardware
used by the victim. As already discussed, the attacker could adapt
the stimuli duration for each specific user and thus ensure that it
remains subliminal.
Furthermore, the subliminal effect can be increased through
non-temporal means in several ways. For instance, stimuli that
are presented in the foveal point (the position of user’s fixation)
require significantly shorter stimulus presentation in order to re-
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main subliminal then parafoveal stimuli, which are approximately
one to five degrees from fixation. Such stimulation can maintain
subliminal effects with a much longer stimulus time [25], [26] and
could be utilized if the attacker knows where the victim’s gaze is
focused, for instance by using a gaze tracking device.
Another factor affecting the subliminal effect is the continua-
tion of the visual processing of a stimulus, long after the stimulus
has disappeared from the user’s sight. After a stimulus is shown
on the screen, the image can still remain on the user’s retina for
duration of up to 30 milliseconds [27]. During this additional time
the visual information is still being sent to the brain. This means
the retina serves as a buffer that undermines the attackers effort of
hiding the stimulus. Particularly, if the face image is shown on a
low entropy background that stays calm for an extended period of
time, the time that the user can ”see” the face exceeds the actual
duration at which it was displayed on the screen.
It has been shown that by placing an even stronger stimulus
directly after the respective stimulus one can overwrite this visual
buffer, a technique named backward masking [28]. Several forms
of backward masking have been explored, ranging from bright
flashes, patterns, and even noises, which would not block low-
level visual processing, but could interrupt higher level vision
processing in the brain [25], [28]. In order to not raise the user’s
alertness, one cannot simply use another artificial image as a mask,
of course. The art of masking a subliminal attack here would
rather be to identify frames of the video/game that provide original
sudden local changes in contrast, color, or sound. The stimulus
could then be deployed directly before such an event occurs.
7.2 Countermeasures
We now discuss several potential countermeasures to attacks
presented in this paper.
Detecting rapid screen changes. In order for the presented
subliminal stimulation to be successful, the attacker needs to
repeat the presentation of the stimulus multiple times, each time
showing it for a very short duration. Assuming that the EEG-
based BCI device controls screen output, such suspiciously short
changes could be detected and result in a warning shown to the
user. A similar example are web browsers that detect attempts of
device fingerprinting using HTML5 Canvas and ask the user if
such behavior should be allowed.
Limiting access to raw data. An obvious potential countermea-
sure is to limit or restrict access to raw EEG data provided by
BCI devices. In this scenario, the core BCI platform analyzes
raw data and detects specific events, while different applications
only receive input about user’s behavior through a specific API.
While such architecture changes can significantly reduce poten-
tial privacy threats, they also reduce the ability of application
developers to innovate in positive ways beyond what the BCI
vendors implement as the interface. Finally, adding noise to raw
data could reduce the potential to extract weaker signals, such as
those resulting from subliminal stimuli, but is likely to also reduce
the performance of other third-party applications that rely on raw
data.
User awareness. Recent research on the impact of subliminal
advertising has shown that individuals who are warned of the
presence of subliminal ads have significantly decreased effects
of advertising compared to the control group [29]. Furthermore,
subliminal effects were reduced even in the case where the
warning was given after the stimulation. While no research has
yet been done on the impact of such warnings on brain activation,
these findings suggest that users could potentially be shielded
against subliminal probing for private information if they were
warned or aware that such possibility exists before they start using
EEG-based BCI devices.
We believe that this paper plays an important first step in the
role of raising awareness of the possibility of subliminal attacks
among both the future users of EEG-based BCI devices, as well
as device vendors, who are in position to pro-actively implement
countermeasures to such threats.
8 RELATED WORK
In this section, we overview existing literature on neuroscientific
aspects of security-relevant applications of EEG.
Recognizing faces for authentication. Any information about
faces familiar to a user should be considered vulnerable private
information as it is already being used for security purposes. The
human ability to recognize and remember faces over extended
periods of time has been utilized as a method of authentication
in which the user identifies familiar faces within a grid of
images [30]. This method was shown to relieve users of the
need to memorize word-based passwords, and instead rely on
the natural ability to remember faces, even along a timespan of
several months. The idea of Passfaces was further extended by
the use of commodity BCI devices [31]. Instead of manually
choosing the correct faces out of a grid of images, the authors
used eye trackers and considered a 0.5 second fixation on a face
as a selection of it. Other applications of facial recognition are
used in real-world situations, for instance security verification
for Facebook users, which requires one to identify their friends
in tagged photos [32]. On a similar note of using subliminal
knowledge in a security context, Bojinov et al. proposed using
implicit learning to implement coercion-resistant passwords for
user authentication [33]. As our experiments demonstrate, facial
recognition can be detected through subliminal presentation of the
stimuli, which poses a threat to such any such security features
that rely on users identifying familiar faces.
Subliminal face recognition. Given that facial recognition is
has been repeatedly proposed as a method of authentication, it
becomes even more important to test the possibilities of extracting
information from facial stimuli. Existing neuroscientific work on
the subliminal perception of human faces shows that ERPs in
response to unpleasant facial expressions have a higher positive
amplitude than pleasant expressions. Furthermore, this effect
shows even through very fast unmasked subliminal presentations
of stimuli, at 1ms [34]. This shows that visual information re-
garding faces can be processed and produce variance in the EEG
signal even at a very subliminal level. Although in our experiment
several subjects had noticed the stimuli, a presentation time as
little as 1 ms could potentially still reveal enough information in
their EEG signal to extract desired information about faces [35].
9 CONCLUSION
In this work we examined the feasibility of subliminal attacks on
users of EEG-based brain-computer interfaces (BCIs).
In a series of experiments with 27 subjects, we find that our
attack is able to detect brain responses to subliminal stimulation
with accuracy that is comparable to the results previously reported
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for supraliminal attacks, even when the classifier is trained on
a different type of brain responses than the ones that are being
probed for. As a consequence, by carefully designing the visual
stimuli, an attacker can reduce the entropy of guessing user’s
private information by more than 20%, while at the same time
achieving that the victim remains unaware of being probed.
As a first attempt to perform subliminal probing, our experi-
ments have been carried out in a controlled setting to demonstrate
their feasibility and exclude other factors that might impede
success. Taking this into account, this paper also discusses attack
improvements that can be achieved outside of a controlled lab
environment and several potential countermeasures that users and
manufacturers of EEG-based BCI devices can take to prevent such
attacks in the future.
Given the recent improvements of measurement performance
and the reduction of prices, the pervasiveness of EEG-based BCI
devices in our daily lives is likely to increase. Consequently, by
experimentally showing the feasibility of such privacy compro-
mises, we believe that this paper makes an important and timely
contribution towards reducing the impending threats of attacks that
include subliminal probing for private user information.
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